4:Grajdanzev--163 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 625, 642, 177.64 Japan
636.64

"Since the mayor and half the members of the Council are appointed by the government, since the mayor and all higher officials have the right to reject the decisions of the councils, since the provincial councils are appointed or elected indirectly and since the advisory council to the governor-general is appointed directly, we may say that after forty-five years of Japanese rule, Taiwan is a colony in the government of which the islanders have no voice whatsoever and in which the Japanese themselves as citizens have little or no influence. The island is ruled by the governor-general with the help of the army and police."

4:Grajdanzev--163 [2] S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 171, 625, 659, 871.177.62 Japan
636.62

"Many times on the preceding pages it has been shown that Taiwan is more poorly supplied with this or that commodity than is Japan proper. But in one respect Taiwan is better supplied——with policemen. According to Dainippon teikoku nenkan (Statistical Year Book of the Japanese Empire) for 1937, there was one policeman for every 1,052 persons in Japan proper in 1937, while in Taiwan there was one for every 580 persons. According to the same source there were more policemen than teachers in Taiwan—— 9,972 policemen in 1937 as compared with 9,651 teachers of all kinds in 1936—while in Japan proper the number of teachers was almost six times as large as the number of policemen. The number of policemen in Taiwan is almost three times the number of physicians."

4:Grajdanzev--163-164 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-2
116, 563, 625, 177.62 Japan
636.62

"Besides having this regular police force the whole country is organized for police purposes through the revival of the old Chinese system of paochia. As we saw, the Chinese of the island have no voice in the government of the island, but they [164] are widely used for police purposes through the paochia system, which is obligatory for the Chinese, but from which the Japanese are free. Ten Chinese families form a chia and ten chia a pao, so that a pao comprises one hundred families or about 500-600 persons. At the end of 1938 there were 53,876 heads of chia and 5,648 heads of paochia (called paocheng in Chinese or hosei in Japanese). All these persons are elected by the members of the chia or pao, but they must be approved by the governor (or the chief of the district). It should be noted, however, that although they have no right to elect their own representatives for the self-government, the members of the pao and chia have the right to elect their own policemen. This paradox is due to the fact that the duties of the chiachang (the head of the chia) and the paocheng are heavy, unpleasant, sometimes dangerous, and completely unpaid, while any expenditures which may be incurred are covered by a tax on the members. Only relatively prosperous men can afford to do this work and even they do it for the most part unwillingly. They police their community under the guidance of the professional policemen, report the number of residents, new arrivals and departures (very severe punishments follow failure to

report), organize groups to pursue 'bandits', take precautionary measures in case of epidemics, repair the roads and bridges, fight insect pests, collect the taxes, etc., etc. If a crime is committed or the chiachang neglects his duty, he is the first person to be held responsible, but he along with the whole group is also held jointly responsible. This system was established by the Japanese government at a time when in spite of all governmental efforts, the island was not pacified, and some extraordinary measures were necessary to bring peace. But now, after more than forty years have passed since its inception, the system is a sign of weakness on the part of the government; it shows its distrust of a people conquered so many years ago and a belief among the rulers that only through this system can peace and order be maintained on the island."

4:Grajdanzev--171 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 208, 641, 625, 177.66 Japan
636.66

"Taiwan was conquered by the Japanese army. The regime which was established there was a military regime, and with few modifications it continues to be a military regime today. The government does not trust the Chinese, spies upon them, and is afraid of any movement which does not emanate from the government-general itself. Suppression of the Chinese culture and forcible japanization of the islanders is considered by the government as the best means of turning the islanders into loyal subjects of the Empire."

15: U.S. Navy --21 [5]
116, 157, 167, 625, 177.18
636.18

(no date) 1944

Formosans
Japanese

"The Japanese are exceptionally thorough and successful organizers, and have brought under their own control the economic life of the island. The police force and many of the urban commercial people came originally from Southern Kyushu and Shikoku, and speak the local dialects of those regions. The Japanese of the metropolitan areas in the homeland speak frankly of the hardness and unattractiveness of the colonial Japanese character in Taiwan."

15: U.S. Navy --26 [13] (no date) 1944 Formosans
116, 625, 556, 744, 177.74 Japanese
636.74

"The Japanese policeman undertakes to instruct rural peoples in sanitation, house-building, religious observance and many other things elsewhere usually left to private initiative. Large-scale public works projects have raised the whole standard of health and public welfare. Extremes of wealth and poverty are not very apparent in normal times."

596 usually bringing their wives and children with them. The proportion of nuclear families has increased with urbanization and industrialization in the past twenty years.

2. Folk Associations

Various Folk Associations: In the
575 pre-modern village community co-operation for mutual aid in making a living was essential, and there were many kinds of associations in response to various social needs. Hitherto specialists on Formosa have focused their attention mainly upon village and family. In fact, folk society attained a fairly high degree of development, and it was much too complex to be managed by blood and locality groups alone. Institutions of social cohesion based on social function or social need was in evidence, and these we will designate as folk associations.

• 625 There were various associations for the protection of agricultural work. When crops and vegetables were still young or almost ripe, they had to be protected from damage by cattle, hogs or chickens. Usually an association was organized to take care of this. Special persons were appointed to watch over the fields. Every household was notified not to let its animals out, and if any one violated the regulation, he was punished by the association. There were associations for the regulation of

625 cutting lumber in the woods owned in common by the village and associations for the protection of fruits, bamboo sprouts, etc. from theft. These were the so-called agricultural protective associations. In the season between the two harvests, at the end of the year or before the next crop was ripe, there were petty grain thefts. For the prevention of these, an assocaition of night watchmen was organized. A person from each household was requisitioned and the group was divided into several small bands which stood watch by turns. To prevent attack by aborigines or bandits, a self-protecting association was organized. All adult males in the village, except the old people, participated in it, and in the time free from work, they trained themselves with various weapons. The need for the regulation of such local group activity was essential and constant. As a result, this kind of association was deeply rooted among the village people in Formosa. Many public works, such as repairing roads, bridges, drainage or irrigation canals, etc. were often managed by these associations and sometimes they constituted an embryonic village government.

575 There were other kinds of associations. A buffalo-keeping association collectively watched the buffalos of each household. It was a kind of co-operative. There were associations for mutual aid for burial in case

631 of eligible voters among the Formosan Chinese
666 was extremely small. In 1935, the year in
641 which the so-called local self-government was introduced, there were 40,297 qualified voters among 270,674 Japanese residents, but only 187,155 qualified voters among 4,674,300 Formosan Chinese. The total membership, including government appointees of provincial, district and city assemblies as instituted in 1935, was 252 Japanese and 169 Formosan Chinese. Thus, not only were all administrative offices almost exclusively staffed by Japanese, but even in provincial and municipal representative bodies the Japanese members also far outnumbered the Formosan members.

•625 For administrative control of the populace, the Japanese relied upon an elaborate police system. This system[8] comprised a civilian police force, numbering over 12,000 in 1940, supplemented by a special police force of over 5,000, functioning in the areas occupied by the aborigines and by a military police force numbering some 6,000. To facilitate the task of the police force, the old Chinese pao-chia system of collective responsibility was revived and strengthened. Approximately ten households formed a chia and ten chia a pao.

8. Ballantine, op. cit., p. 28.

625 The Chia-chang [head of a chia] and pao-cheng [head of a pao] were chosen from among the elders of the households concerned, but they were subject to the approval of the provincial and county officials and the police.[9] The term of office was two years. They did not draw any pay and the expenses were levied on the members. The duties of the chia-chang and the pao cheng were many and varied; the principal ones were the maintenance of peace and order and the taking of a local census. They had to report new arrivals and departures, disseminate public information, collect taxes, and report law-breakers. If a crime was committed, these heads were first held responsible, but the whole group shared that responsibility along with the heads. Membership in the mutual responsibility organization was obligatory for all Formosan Chinese and failure to co-operate with the group became a matter for the police. Japanese residents were not required to become members. The police on Formosa were dreaded by the inhabitants for their ruthless brutality. An interesting analogy can be drawn between the pao-chia in Formosa under the Japanese rule and the inhabitants'

9. Since 1936 a knowledge of the Japanese language had been made a requisite for these positions.

625 committee and inhabitants' teams that exist under the Communist regime in Mainland China today. With the efficient espionage built on the pao-chia system, the Japanese were able to control every household in Formosa just as the Communists are using the inhabitants' organizations to maintain an effective check on every household in Communist-dominated China.

635 After World War II, the Chinese govern-
631 ment took over the administration of Formosa and made the island one of the thirty-five provinces of China. However, the head of the provincial government was named administrator-general, and he was also commander-in-chief of the garrisons. The administrator-general exercised considerably wider power than a provincial governor; he supervised both the work of provincial machinery and the administrative functions assumed by the central government in the province. This arrangement was intended to be a temporary one during the period of the transfer of

697 an infirmary. Efforts have been successful in preventing epidemics and infectious diseases among the prisoners.

697 165 The number of deaths[8] in prisons and detention houses has been progressively reduced during the past five years although the number of inmates has remained more or less constant. The following table attests to the improved conditions in Formosan prisons.

DEATH RATE IN FORMOSAN PRISONS */

At End of Year	Number of Inmates In Prisons	Number of Inmates In Detention Homes	Total No. of Deaths During the Year
1949	2,909	1,691	70
1950	2,619	1,209	23
1951	3,667	2,043	19
1952	2,906	1,954	13
1953	3,021	2,346	8
1954	—	—	—

*/ Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1953, 1954.

II. THE POLICE SYSTEM

625 635 The Ministry of Interior of the Executive Yuan exercises general supervision over the

8. In 1946 there were 863 deaths caused by epidemics in Formosan prisons. The number of deaths in prison in 1947 was 222 and in 19[illegible], 156.

635 police system of the entire country, but the 635 actual administration of police affairs is delegated to the provincial government.[9] In Taiwan Province, there are twenty-one police bureaus (one in each hsien and city, and one in Yangmingshan Special District), 90 branch bureaus, 202 police stations, and 1,268 substations, all of which are under the direction of the police department of the provincial government.

625 The functions of the police, as enumerated in the Police Law, are: (a) to issue police order; (b) to punish contraventions of police regulations; (c) to assist in the investigation of crimes; (d) to search, detain, or arrest suspects; (e) to execute administrative orders; (f) to preserve order, to regulate traffic, to protect health, to take census, to guard against fire, disaster, moral turpitude, and defacement of private and public properties.[10] The punishment for violating police regulations is limited to a fine under NT$100 or a detention of not more than fourteen days. Criminal cases are sent to law courts for prosecution.

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9. Police Law 1953, Article 3.
10. Ibid., Article 9.

625 874 The exact number of personnel belonging to the police force on Formosa is not available. According to the China Handbook for 1954-55, the total police force numbered a little more than 20,000 in 1953.[11] There are two schools devoted to the training of police personnel: the Central Police Academy trains officers, the Taiwan Police Academy trains enlisted men. In 1953, ten officers were selected for advanced training in the United States and Japan.

III. MEASURES AGAINST COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

668 648 The Communists in Peking see Formosa as a potential threat to their regime in contradistinction to the Chinese people on the Mainland, who look to Formosa in the hope of ultimate emancipation. As long as Formosa remains free, it is a thorn in their flesh. The Nationalist Government may use the island as a staging area in preparation for an attack on the China Mainland, much as the Allies made use of Britain prior to the invasion of Nazi-dominated Europe. In consequence, Communists never relent in their effort to infiltrate into the island.

648 625 The Nationalist Government, alert to the presence of saboteurs and spies, has organized a security network under the direction of Lt. General Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek. The security network is controlled by the

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11. China Handbook 1954-55, Taipei, China Publishing Company, 1954, p. 184.

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625 Files Office (Tzu-liao Shih), attached to the President's Office (Tsung-t'ung Fu). There are security agencies, called investigation and statistics bureaus, in the Ministry of Defense, the Kuomintang, and the Ministry of the Interior (in charge of police). These agencies operate secretly and are known to have made arrests, conducted trials in camera, and even imprisoned and executed political offenders.

Formosa's public security agency is the Peace Preservation Corps, organized in 1949 for the express purpose of maintaining peace and order on the island. Its main objective is to suppress all subversive activities before they can threaten national security. Detachments of the corps are located at strategic points for the protection of railways, bridges, waterworks, power stations, mines, and industrial plants. Mountainous areas are regularly patrolled by members of the corps, and no one is allowed to enter the mountain regions without express permission. The Peace Preservation Corps also regulates all arrivals and departures from the island to prevent smuggling as well as the infiltration of Communist agents.

[635] The governor of Taiwan Province (ex officio) is nominally the commander of the Peace Preservation Corps, but in fact the corps receives orders directly from Chiang Ching-kuo.

In 1950, an underground Communist organization, whose membership included a deputy chief-of-staff, the wife of the general in

charge of training the new army, and the managing director of the Taiwan Sugar Corporation, was exposed by the Peace Preservation Corps. According to the China Handbook 1954-55, approximately one-hundred espionage cases, involving some 4,500 people, have been uncovered in the past four years.[12] The Pan-Asia Alliance News Agency reported on January 3, 1956 that, according to an official release, Communist agents were most active in Formosa just before the conflict in Korea began, but since the launching of the Counterespionage Campaign in 1950, a number of Communist cells have been discovered. In 1955, two conspiracies were suppressed, although the government report does not give further details. One of these cases may have involved the attempt of Major Kuo T'ing-liang to assassinate President Chiang in May 1955. The case was widely publicized because it resulted in the resignation of General Sun Li-jen, former commander-in-chief of the Nationalist land forces, who had been Kuo's superior for many years.

In 1951, the Nationalist Government called upon Communists to renounce their affiliation with the Party; in return, they would receive assurance from the government that their life and property would be protected.[13] Several hundred

12. China Handbook, 1954-55, p. 184.

13. Procedures for Communists and Fellow-travelers to Surrender, promulgated on Sept. 16, 1951.

Communists have since surrendered to the government.[14]

The tightness of security control and the severity of punishment have gained for Formosa the unpleasant appellation of a "Police State." It might be true that in proportion to the size of the territory and the population the number of secret service men is unduly large. This will be no surprise if we take into consideration the fact that the security agents of the Nationalist Government formerly patrolled all of China, a territory 160 times larger than the island of Formosa, and that when the continent was overrun by the Communists, the great majority of those security men had to withdraw to Formosa, for they, more than other groups, were most hated by the Communists. Nevertheless, the swarming of secret service men in Formosa has created the impression that everyone on the island is being haunted by the shadow of a Police State.[15] It is also possible that some searches and arrests have been unwarranted. But overcaution is inevitable as Nationalist China is at war with a ruthless and unscrupulous enemy. After all, under martial law, persons endangering the safety of a nation may be sentenced to death

14. China Yearbook, 1953, p.825:203 Communists surrendered between May 1952 and April 1953. China Handbook 1954-55, p.184: "More than 100 Communists gave themselves up in 1953."

15. [see following page]

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or to imprisonment for not less than ten years.

The Nationalist Government has been frequently accused of showing little mercy to its enemies, of "imposing more death sentences than anyone else outside the Iron Curtain."[16] In referring to such criticism, Lih-wu Han, former Minister of Education, explains that the government cannot afford to be other than strict and severe. Extreme penalties are necessary because the safety of the island and its people is at stake. Exposure by the government of Communist espionage clearly indicates the nature and extent of the danger. "The electric plant would have been

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15. "The P. D. (Political Department of the Ministry of Defense) is undermining the Army. Instead of seeing comrades to their right and left, soldiers see political spies marching beside them." Robert S. Elegant, "How Good is Chiang's Army," The Reporter, Vol. 5, No. 13, Dec. 25, 1951, p. 18. "Throughout my stay I was haunted by the shadow of a Police State malevolent in its objectives and far-reaching in its methods." H. Maclear Bate, Report from Formosa, London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1952, p. 22.

16. H. Maclear Bate, ibid., p. 49.

625 blown up and water works wrecked if the Com-
648 munists had had their way. The lives of responsible personages would have been in constant danger, too. Then, the risk of internal trouble during a possible invasion from outside would have been very grave."[17] It appears that, in order to save Formosa from Communist domination, rigid government control may not be entirely indefensible.

722 During the past few years, as conditions
698 on the island grew more stable, the Nationalist
693 Government has been taking measures to guard against unwarranted arrest and imprisonment. In a decree issued on January 29, 1951, the Executive Yuan prescribed that public defenders should be provided in the military court to defend persons accused of violating martial law in cases where the minimum punishment would be not less than five years' imprisonment. A spouse, lineal blood relative, collateral blood relative within third degree, or a statutory agent may be present at the trial and testify on behalf of the accused.

722 Since 1949 Formosa has been subject to
698 martial law. Article 8 provides that the following offenses committed in strategic zones may be tried by the military court: (a) offenses against the internal security of the state, (b) against the external security of the state, (c) against public order, (d) against public safety, (e) forgery, counterfeiting of currency, valuable securities, documents, (f) murder or homicide, (g) restraining personal liberty, (h) snatching, robbery, and piracy, (i) intimidation and kidnapping, and (j) malicious mischief. If provisions

17. Lih-wu Han, op. cit., p. 49.

52:Steiner S-4 (no date) 1951
AF1 China
FORMOSA AD1

701 government schools; free medical clinic service with 50 per cent discount on surgery; retention of vacated jobs; priority in leasing public lands for cultivation; and priority in loans for co-operative enterprises. A major part of expenditures for this program is borne by provincial, municipal, and county government.[52]

Police System

625 The police administration of Taiwan follows a centralized system. The province is divided into a number of police districts and patrolled by a police force commanded by the Department of Police of the Provincial Government. Its jurisdiction also extends to harbor and railroad patrol. The exact size of the police force is not known.[53]

Nationalist policies have been directed mainly toward the improvement of the service. The over-all emphasis on security, centrally administered, has not been changed. Briefly, the average educational qualifications of the officers of the police have been raised. Of 3,109 officers, 72 per cent are graduates of colleges or technical or military schools of college standing. Native Taiwanese in the service are being promoted. Salaries and in-service training are being stepped up. A police school, managed by the national authorities and financed by the provincial government, has been in operation since 1948.[54] In addition, since 1947 an "economic police" has been engaged in detection of currency forgeries, underground financial operations and black-marketing, bootlegging of liquor,

[52] *Taiwan Reconstruction*, Vol. 1, p. 15.

[53] Department of Police. *Police and Public Safety*. Taipeh. 1949. The Department of Police estimated a police force of 13,000 under the Japanese, but did not disclose the Nationalist figure.

[54] For data in this paragraph, see *Taiwan Reconstruction*, Vol. 2, pp. 331–44.

[P. 222 (A)]

52:Steiner S-4 (no date)1951
AF1 China
FORMOSA AD1

625 wine, tobacco, and salt in violation of government monopoly, and violations of the 37.5 rent reduction program.

Conclusions

643 In describing the Nationalist government policies, 1949–51, the writer has sought to ascertain their nature and contents by recounting a chain of events which set the political pattern in contemporary Taiwan and by a survey of what has taken place since. From them may be drawn the following tentative conclusions:

1. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters have been exercising a dominant role in National Government policies, 1949–51.

665 2. While there are three known political parties active in national politics in Taiwan, the Kuomintang, as presently constituted, is the ruling party.

631 3. The political framework in Taiwan may be described as one of over-all political control by the Nationalist government, centralized management by the provincial government, and local self-government, still in its preliminary stage, at the municipal and county levels.

652 4. The National Taiwan currency has exhibited a degree of stability which compares favorably with that in most postwar countries having suffered from war devastation.

5. Nationalist government assets and reserve, sale of government properties, and ECA assistance are contributing factors in balancing the provincial budgets in recent years.

427 6. The 37.5 rent reduction program has contributed towards rural well-being, along with the projects sponsored by the Joint Committee on Rural Rehabilitation.

433 7. There has been an upward trend in agricultural and industrial produc-

[p. 222 (B)]